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financial deepening represents a form of capital market repression, not unlike the 
growth-depressing effects of financial repression in many poor countries. 
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MONEY AND TAXES--THE RELATION BETWEEN 
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND TAXATION 
 
Mack Ott and John A. Tatom 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of institutions in the theory of economic development regained critical 
significance in the last decade, and this is nowhere more true than in efforts to 
explain the importance of monetary institutions in providing stable-valued money.1  
At the same time, attention has returned to the issue of the role of financial 
development as a factor affecting economic growth and development.2  Taxes and 
inflation have long been recognized as providing incentives to avoid holding deposits 
in financial institutions and instead to employ barter, use domestic currency in black 
markets, or substitute foreign money as the principal unit of account, store of value 
and medium of exchange.  Since both taxes and inflation are in the hands of the state, 
our hypothesis is that financial development and overall economic growth are 
dependent on the actions of the state. 
 
The linkages between taxation and monetary development are not simple ones, 
however.  As Lerner (1947) explained, the demand for domestic fiat money is rooted 
in the ability to use it to pay domestic taxes.  In effect, taxation is the basis of a legal 
tender approach to money demand and hence to the development of a financial 
                                                 
 
1 An important example in this renewal is North (1990).  The literature on central bank independence, 
monetary constitutions, the role of transparency and credibility all reflect the growing importance of 
institutional development in promoting economic performance.    
2 Early proponents of the importance of financial development for economic growth are Shaw (1973) 
and McKinnon (1973).  See Levine (1997) for a recent survey of the literature on the significance of 
this linkage.  
system that produces and distributes financial assets based on domestic money.3  In 
this sense, taxation forms the institutional basis for money demand.  As a result, in 
new states the level of taxation is a positive factor in boosting financial development.  
Beyond some level, however, taxation, like inflation, provides an incentive to reduce 
money demand and thereby reduces the size and contribution of the financial sector.4  
Thus taxation takes on a special role in institutional development in new transition or 
emerging economies.  This special role is the focus of this article.  
 
This paper examines the connection between the use of domestic money—currency 
and deposits—and the effects of increased tax effort in enhancing such utilization in 
transition economies.  This investigation is conducted in the broader context of 
effects of taxes in both emerging markets and developed countries to clarify the 
channels of influence.  Broadly speaking, most transition and emerging economies 
are beset by numerous challenges to effective development and growth of the 
financial sector.  These challenges include:  
•  mistrust of banks due to their history of frozen accounts, outright 
expropriation, lack of privacy,  
•  recurring bouts of high inflation reducing the credibility of the value of 
domestic currency deposits, 
                                                 
3 Selgin (1994) attributes to Knapp (1924) the idea that a requirement to use domestic fiat money is 
the basis for the demand for such money.  Indeed, Knapp anticipated the arguments of Lerner by more 
than 50 years.  We are grateful to Professor Selgin for calling our attention to Knapp’s work.  Selgin 
discounts the role of Knapp’s notion of “public receivability,” suggesting that it was secondary to a 
legal tender basis of fiat money.  
4 To anticipate the argument below, states with relatively high tax rates could see another reversal in 
the effect of taxes on financial development.  Taxation of capital income taxes risk-taking and at a 
sufficiently high level could provide an incentive to hold safe, low-yield bank deposits at the expense 
of risky assets.  This could further the development of banking sector at the expense of entrepreneurial 
activity and growth.  
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•  associated devaluations of domestic currency reducing money’s purchasing 
power, 
•  ineffective tax administration, lowering the cost of tax evasion and increasing 
the   proportion of underground economic activity,  
•  high tax rates on visible activities increasing the incentive to go underground,  
•   relatively large size of the underground economy, reducing the utility of 
recorded  
•  transactions,  
•  ineffective tax treatment of services,  
•  lack of contract enforcement, in particular ineffective seizures of liens on 
collateral, and  
•  lack of land or real property transferability.  
 
This list, by no means exhaustive, suggests that money is less useful or more costly 
to use in transition and emerging economies than in mature market economies.5  
Also implied is a relation to tax policy, and it is that tack that we will follow in this 
paper.  In the next section, Abba Lerner’s notion (1947) of money backed by implied 
tax liabilities is reviewed.  From this discussion, the relation between money demand 
and taxation is inferred and differentiated from other effects of taxation. These 
relations are specified as a hypothesis in section 2.  Section 3 presents the empirical 
tests and results.  Brief concluding remarks are offered in section 4. 
2.  MONEY AS A CREATURE OF THE STATE 
                                                 
5 Beim and Calomiris (2000) discuss several other features that characterize financial repression (or 
result from it) including low real rates of interest, small shares of private sector credit and of bank 
lending, high reserve ratios and small market capitalization of financial firms relative to GDP.  
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 For as long as fiat money has been used, the conundrum of its acceptability in 
exchange has been debated by philosophers, historians and economists.  According 
to historians, when Marco Polo returned to Venice in the 14th century and reported 
that the Chinese used paper money, the proffered rationalization was alchemy; that 
is, somehow, the Chinese were able to convert paper to gold.6  Of course, this 
explanation is intrinsically valid: When paper money is backed by a commodity such 
as gold, the use of the relatively worthless surrogate is understood to be a claim 
check on the underlying asset.7  When money is not transformable into a commodity, 
but is simply declared to be legal tender as with contemporary currencies in the 
OECD economies, the apparent mystery remains. 
 
A variety of explanations have been offered, most of which depend on some version 
of the greater fool theory—i.e., that the next seller is expected to accept it, so I will 
accept it.  In comparison with commodity-backed money or bank money where 
either a real store of value or services is offered to compensate for the risk of devalue 
or dishonor, pure fiat money has no inherent rationale for its acceptability:  I accept 
it in exchange because I expect the next trading agent will be as naive as I am.8   
 
Abba Lerner offered a simple and sensible alternative to the greater fool theory for 
fiat money’s acceptance.  This argument was developed earlier and in more detail by 
Knapp (1924), but Lerner was apparently unfamiliar with it.  Knapp was quite 
                                                 
6 See DeSoto (2000), p. 222. 
7 This is the logic of the traditional goldsmith story used in money and banking courses, based on the 
origins of partial reserve banking in the Renaissance in northern Italy. 
8 Kovenock and DeVries (2002) provide a model of demand for money based on a variant of the 
“greater-fool” theory.   
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explicit about the importance of the role of compulsory use of domestic money for 
tax payments in laying the basis for money demand.  Indeed, he emphasized that a 
legal tender basis was not enough to motivate the demand for domestic money: 
 
 “In the autumn of 1895, in a course of lectures in Berlin, I put forward my 
views fully for the first time, laying down: that the money of a State is not 
what is of generally compulsory general acceptance, but what is accepted at 
the public pay offices.” p.vii (emphasis added) 
 
Lerner’s explanation, like Knapp’s, for the acceptability of fiat money relies on the 
need for fiat money balances to pay tax liabilities: the government is not just willing, 
it requires payment in fiat currency for tax liabilities.9  Thus, in order to pay his 
taxes, each person must accumulate fiat money balances equal to his tax liability by 
the end of the tax period.  This anticipated transaction—which requires a payment in 
fiat money—provides a convertibility guarantee for the fiat money during the period.  
Further, assuming that the tax liability is accepted and that the individual anticipates 
paying it punctually, he would have to accumulate money balances in advance of its 
due date.  This implies that an effective tax program would create incentives to 
acquire and hold fiat money balances because, unlike the greater fool theory, it is 
certain that the tax collector will exchange—at a fixed and certain rate—the 
accumulated fiat money balances for the tax liability. These required money balances 
will be positively related to the size of the anticipated tax bill, which, in turn, is 
positively related to the individual’s tax rate.  Consequently, the demand for money 
balances should be positively related to some measure of the government’s effort to 
                                                 
9 This is not to argue that the existence of tax payments requires the introduction of fiat money.  To 
the contrary, the sovereign could dictate that commodity money or foreign money of any type be 
used.  The requirement that tax payments be made in domestic fiat money, including bank deposits 
backed by domestic outside money, gives rise to a demand for domestic fiat money.    
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collect taxes.  While the anticipated tax liability provides an incentive to hold fiat 
money balances, they do not need to be held in physical form as cash; a more 
efficient alternative would be bank deposit balances, either to facilitate other interim 
transactions or to earn interest.  Thus, a broad measure of money (M2) which is 
convertible on reasonable notice into transferable funds should be the measure of the 
relevant asset whose demand is boosted by this requirement to pay taxes with fiat 
money.10
 
A systematic direct and positive relation is therefore expected to hold between tax 
effectiveness and both money demand and the size of the domestic financial sector.  
The higher the proportion of taxes that is collected, the higher will be the use of 
domestic money in the economy relative to foreign or private money and relative to 
GDP.  This implies a positive relation between the average tax rate and (1) the use of 
domestic money in financing GDP expenditures—i.e., money demand, or the ratio of 
money to GDP, and (2) the size of the monetary sector, at least for “low-to 
moderate” levels of taxation and development.  It also follows that both money 
demand and the size of the monetary sector should be enhanced by greater tax effort.  
Note that this implies that the institution or existence of taxation requiring payment 
in domestic money not only generates a demand for domestic money, but the level of 
the tax rate incrementally affects the quantity of this money demand.    
 
                                                 
10 A referee of an earlier version of this paper suggested that mixing bank deposits and outside money 
muddles the issue of the demand for fiat money because bank deposits are not fiat money.  We 
disagree and assume here that bank deposits backed by domestic fiat money are also fiat money.  A 
basis for holding fiat money also bolsters the financial system according to the tax hypothesis.   
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Taxation has several effects beyond providing a basis for the demand for money, 
however.  Typically, a large share of economic activity in emerging economies and 
especially in transition economies is underground.  There are only two reasons for 
economic activities to be underground—either the activity is per se illegal or the 
entrepreneur is avoiding taxes on otherwise legal activity.11  Thus, in the transition 
economies tax compliance is not high, taxes are actively evaded or avoided, and, as a 
result, measured GDP is understated.  Furthermore, banks are not trusted--both 
because of the frequency with which deposits are frozen and because bank deposits 
and transactions using them provide data to the tax authorities about the income of 
the depositor.  Thus, for tax-evaders, bank accounts do not provide a low-cost 
transactions medium.  So, there is reason to expect that the relation between money 
demand and taxes could be attenuated by the relative size and growth of the 
underground economy—that is, the component of national income that is not 
included in GDP.  The latter, in turn, is influenced by the size of the average tax 
rate.12
 
At a sufficiently high tax rate, individuals have an incentive to use barter, foreign 
money or domestic currency instead of domestic deposits for transactions and, in the 
latter cases, as liquid stores of value.  The same effects arise in traditional tax 
avoidance behavior in the legal economy.  Substitution of domestic currency for 
                                                 
11 For simplicity, bureaucratic costs such as licensure and regulation can be thought of as part of tax 
load. 
12 Cagan (1958) and Feige (1985) emphasize the importance of taxation in affecting the demand for 
currency and the size of the underground economy.  See Hill and Kabir (2000) for a recent review and 
evidence of tax effects on Canadian currency demand. Feige (1994) points out the importance of both 
the US underground economy and foreign underground economy for US currency demand.  He argues 
that the latter is more substantial than the domestic underground economy and points up the 
importance of the issue for other major currencies.   
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bank deposits reduces the relative size of the financial sector as indicated in the 
money multiplier – the ratio of M2 to the monetary base.  In addition, tax avoidance 
reduces the overall demand for money.  A third channel of tax influence is that the 
average tax rate reduces wealth and disposable income and could further reduce 
money demand.  Thus, a non-linear relation of tax rates to money demand and the 
size of the money multiplier is likely.  Only at low tax rates and low real GDP per 
capita levels will the tax rate have a positive effect on money demand and the money 
multiplier.13   
 
Finally there is a fourth channel of influence of taxation, though not relevant to 
emerging or transition economies.  Taxation of capital market returns implies that the 
return to risk-taking is subject to taxation.  A higher tax rate reduces the return on 
risky assets relative to that on safe assets such as bank deposits.  At a sufficiently 
high tax rate, the demand for safe assets could actually be boosted by tax increases.  
This implies a second switch in high income countries in which money demand 
and/or the money multiplier is raised when taxes increase, just as in very low 
income, emerging or transition economies, but for very different reasons.  If such a 
switch occurs, it casts serious doubt on potential growth effects of financial sector 
development.  Such instances of a broader type of capital market repression are most 
likely only at high levels of taxation.  In fact, there is evidence below of precisely 
this sort of re-switching.  It is important to bear in mind that a positive relation 
                                                 
13 The tax rate and real GDP per capita are strongly positively correlated and can, with caution, be 
used interchangeably for low-income countries, presumably due to Wagner’s Law.  There are 
certainly other factors that can lead to low tax rates in relatively high income countries; indeed low 
tax rates often are cited as factor boosting the level of real GDP per capita (the US, Japan, 
Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan come to mind).   
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between tax rates and the demand for money at low tax/income levels is beneficial to 
financial development and presumably growth, while the same positive relationship 
in high-tax countries would represent a broader form of financial repression.14   
 
3. THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON MONETARY DEEPENING AND THE 
MONEY MULTIPLIER--BASIC DATA CHARACTERISTICS15   
 
The analysis above implies that both the demand for money and the money 
multiplier are affected by the average tax rate.  Since the effect of the tax rate is 
hypothesized to vary with the state of financial market development, separate tests 
are conducted for emerging economies and for developed countries.  The principal 
hypothesis is that at low levels of taxes (and real income per capita) increases in the 
average tax rate raises money demand and the money multiplier in emerging 
economies.  Second, at sufficiently high tax rates, increases in tax rates lower both 
money demand and the money multiplier.  The first hypothesis is based on the theory 
                                                 
14 There is no distinction here between different forms of taxation, particularly whether direct or 
indirect.  It would be useful to investigate whether this difference matters, but data limitations 
preclude it here.  Tax-based money demand is not dependent on the type of tax system, in principle.  
Kesselman (1993) has examined the effect of the tax mix on underground activity.  Hill and Kabir 
(2000), following Smith (1994), note that similar evasion incentives exist for indirect taxes as exist for 
direct taxes.  They find direct taxes have somewhat larger effects on currency demand in Canada than 
do value added taxes, however. Schneider (1994) shows that direct taxes in Canada have 
insignificantly larger positive effects on currency demand than do indirect taxes.  The elasticities of 
real currency per capita with respect to direct taxes and indirect taxes are (standard errors in 
parentheses) 0.173 (0.056) and 0.117 (0.062), respectively, for the period 1956-91. Schneider also 
shows that the complexity of the tax system and the intensity of regulation have important effects on 
the currency ratio and underground economy.  Indeed he argues that the effects of a major tax reform 
that lowered rates in 1989 was more than offset by a rise in the complexity of the tax system and 
increased burden of regulation.  Schneider does not include inflation as a factor reducing real currency 
demand.  
    
15 In the discussion and tests, M2 is used as the monetary asset.  As monetary balances are 
accumulated to pay the tax liability at period’s end, they could be held in time deposits as well as in 
demand deposits. Milton Friedman’s aphorism that money is “the temporary abode of purchasing 
power” provides a familiar justification for preferring the broader measure of money.  In addition, to 
assess financial sector development, a broader measure of bank liabilities is required than transaction 
deposits alone.  
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that money is a creature of the state, so that money demand is rooted in the 
imperative to pay taxes with domestic money.  The second hypothesis is based on the 
fact that as taxes rise, tax evasion incentives progressively dominate, reducing 
money demand and the relative appeal of using domestic financial institutions.  Since 
the effects in emerging economies can reverse sign as the tax rate rises, a quadratic 
tax effect is included in each specification.  Moreover, the same quadratic tax rate 
effect specification is included in the developed country tests.  This allows the 
possibility that there is re-switching of the tax rate effect at relatively high levels of 
the tax rate such as those found in some developed economies.  Such a re-switching 
is based on “capital market repression” in which high taxes on entrepreneurial 
activity and risk-taking lower such activity relative to increased holdings of low-
return, safe money balances.     
 
The principal dependent variable in our tests is the velocity of M2 (V), which is the 
measured by the ratio of GDP to M2.  This is the inverse of money demand, a 
common measure of financial depth.  In addition, we also estimate the effect of tax 
effort on the monetary-base multiplier (K) as tax effort is expected to reduce the 
demand for currency relative to transaction deposits, and to boost the demand for 
interest earning deposits at banks at least in low-tax countries.16  These two effects 
                                                 
16 Beim and Calomiris (2000), following earlier studies, use the inverse of velocity as the indicator of 
liquidity, or financial deepening; a relatively low level of liquidity (high velocity) is an indicator of 
financial repression, as is a high level of bank reserves as a ratio to M2.  This is consistent with the 
description above that emerging economies tend to have high velocities and low M2 multipliers.  
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) argue that financial repression boosts money demand.  Such 
an effect is opposite to the expectation in the literature that financial repression raises the cost of 
financial intermediation and of holding money, in particular deposits, and hence raises velocity.  It is 
also at odds with the evidence that velocity is highest in countries with a greater degree of financial 
repression.  A simple example is a higher reserve requirement that directly and indirectly lowers the 
money multiplier.  More important, a higher reserve requirement raises the cost of holding deposits 
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raise the M2 multiplier, but at higher tax rates, tax evasion effects may reverse the 
effects of a higher tax rate, so that a higher tax rate would reduce the money 
multiplier.  As with money demand, an expected positive effect is expected to 
dominate at low tax rates.  
 
The velocity of money and the M2 multiplier are both expected to depend upon other 
factors, most notably, real per capita income and the cost of holding money.  The 
principal cost of holding money that has been identified in the literature is 
inflation.17  Inflation is a tax on real cash balances and hence reduces money demand 
or raises the velocity of money.  A second key factor that influences money demand 
is real income per capita.  For example, Selden (1956) and Friedman (1956) explain 
that if money is a luxury good, which earlier evidence had suggested, the growth in 
real income raises the demand for real cash balances more than proportionately, so 
that velocity would fall as real income per capita rises.18  In a growing economy 
where transaction deposits have a higher elasticity of demand than currency, and/or 
non-transaction deposits have a higher income elasticity of demand than transaction 
deposits, a rise in real income will boost the M2 multiplier.  Finally, technological 
change and rising transfer efficiencies reduce the cost of financial services and 
                                                                                                                                          
and money, thereby raising velocity.  Other forms of repression also raise the cost of holding and 
using deposits, with similar effects.   
17 See Friedman (1956), Cagan (1956) and Selden (1956).   
18 Bordo and Jonung (1981) argue that velocity has a U-shaped trend over time, initially declining due 
to monetization of the economy and the rise of commercial banking, but rising later as a result of 
increasing financial sophistication and increasing economic stability.  The same U-shaped pattern is 
expected here for transition and emerging economies based on the tax hypotheses.  Bordo and Jonung 
indicate that the taxation of income from stocks and bonds could also affect velocity (p.113), but they 
do not indicate the source or direction of this effect. They focus on five developed economies (US, 
UK, Canada, Norway and Sweden), but their time period of 1870-1972 makes the relevant 
comparison here the experience in the emerging economies.  Bordo and Jonung generally find that the 
real per capita income elasticity of money demand is one or less, contrary to the luxury hypothesis.  
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intermediation over time, lowering prices and providing incentives that increase the 
demand for money, especially bank deposits.  To capture these effects, or control for 
them in the empirical specifications, we include the logarithm of real GDP per capita 
(ln X), the rate of inflation (Pdot), a time trend (trend), along with the tax-GDP ratio 
(T) and the square of the tax-GDP ratio (T2).   
 
 The empirical specifications employed are: 
 
  V = a0 + a1 Pdot + a2 T + a3 T2 + a4 ln X + a5 trend,  
(1)  
 K = b0 + b1 Pdot + b2 T + b3 T2 + b4 ln X + b5 trend 
 
For transition and emerging economies, the expected coefficients on T are negative 
in the velocity equation (a2 < 0) and positive in the money multiplier equation (b2 > 
0).  As a result of the dominance of tax avoidance at higher levels of taxes, we expect 
the coefficient on the square of the tax rate (T2), to have the opposite sign, the same 
sign as the other major cost of holding money, inflation (a3, a1 > 0; b3 < 0).19  In 
developed economies, tax avoidance is again expected to be dominant so that the 
coefficient on the tax rate, T, in the velocity equation is expected to be the same as 
that on inflation and opposite to the signs in emerging economies (a2 > 0).  To allow 
for a possible non-linear effect, we include the same quadratic tax term in the 
developed country estimates.  The income per capita effects are expected to be 
similar across countries with either negative or no effects on velocity (depending on 
whether money demand is a luxury or a normal good, respectively) and 
                                                 
19 The effect of inflation on the money multiplier is not well established.  With competitive banking, 
inflation should raise the cost of transactions deposits relative to the cost of currency and the returns 
on non-transaction deposits, but these have offsetting effects on the multiplier.    
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corresponding positive or null effects on the money multiplier.  The trend term is 
included to capture the increasing financial market sophistication of economies over 
time that is expected to boost money demand and the relative demand for private 
deposits over central bank money.  Hence, the coefficients a5 and b5 are expected to 
be negative and positive, respectively.   
 
The relative size of the underground economy is expected to reduce the quantity of 
domestic currency and deposits demanded, reduce real GDP relative to overall 
income, and to reduce the M2 multiplier, according to the analysis above.  Since the 
size of the underground economy is not included in the estimates of equation (1), the 
coefficients in the estimated relationships could be biased.  First, both inflation and 
the tax rate are expected to boost the size of the underground economy.  Since this 
would lower the money multiplier and raise velocity, the omission of this variable 
would result in estimates of the coefficient on the tax rate and on inflation that are 
biased downward in the case of the money multiplier (b1 and b2).  Since the effect of 
these measures is hypothesized to be positive for the money multiplier, at least at low 
levels of income, or especially, then, in emerging economies, these potential biases 
make it more likely to reject the hypotheses even if the hypotheses are true.  
Similarly for velocity, the coefficients are expected to be negative under the same 
conditions and the potential upward bias would make it more likely to reject a true 
hypothesis.  
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Second, an increase in the size of the underground economy lowers the level of 
measured real GDP.  This can introduce a bias into the estimated effect of real GDP 
on either velocity or the money multiplier.  Some of the decline in the money 
demand or the money multiplier arising from an increase in the size of the 
underground economy could be erroneously attributed to the effect of the related 
decline in real GDP, so the estimates of b4 could be biased downward and the effect 
of income on velocity (a4) is biased upward.  We have no way of knowing the size of 
the effects of such biases, but at least in the case of tax effects, the central concern 
here, the direction of the bias works in favor of rejecting the hypothesis.  Thus, 
failure to reject the hypotheses is stronger evidence than it would otherwise appear. 
 
3.1.  The data and countries  
 
The hypotheses above were tested using data for 31 emerging economies and 17 
developed countries for the period 1970-2000 (see Appendix A for the data sources, 
a list of the countries included and a list of missing data by country).20  Countries 
were chosen on the basis of data availability and groupings were based on popular 
definitions.  Thus, for example, Singapore and Spain, which were emerging 
economies at least in the early part of the sample period, are included with developed 
economies.  Greece and Portugal, both European Union countries that are now part 
of the European Monetary Union, are included with the emerging economies 
countries, as is South Korea.  Given the large number of observations in each group, 
                                                 
20 Partial data for eight other important emerging or transition economies were available, but were not 
used in the regression analysis below because either the tax rate, velocity or real GDP per capita were 
missing for all years in the source data.  These include Hong Kong, China, Russia, Croatia, Lebanon, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia.   
 13
we do not expect the results to be affected by these choices.  Seven transition 
economies are included (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, and Romania), but only limited data is available for them.  Indeed, 
data limitations are very great and prompt the use of cross-section, time-series 
regressions, though this would be a preferred method in any event. 
 
Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of the measures for emerging and developed 
economies.  As indicated earlier, emerging economies have much lower money 
multipliers and higher velocities than do developed countries.  They also have lower 
average tax rates, much higher inflation rates and, of course, substantially lower real 
income per capita.21   
 
4. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF TAXATION 
EFFECTS 
 
Tables 2A and 2B provide correlation coefficients for the principal variables here.  In 
emerging markets there is a significantly large negative correlation between the tax 
rate and velocity, indicating that higher tax rates are associated with larger money 
demand as hypothesized above.22  Note that for developed countries this correlation 
                                                 
21 This characterization may appear to suggest that there is an inverse correlation between inflation 
and the tax rate arising from substitution of the inflation tax for income and other taxes on economic 
activity.  This would follow Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and might further suggest that higher 
tax effort could reduce the inflation tax and inflation rate, with the latter effect boosting money 
demand somewhat.  There is no correlation between inflation and the tax rate in emerging economies, 
however, according to Table 2A below.  More importantly, in an efficient tax system both the tax rate 
and the inflation rate would move up together as the share of government expenditure increases.  The 
tax rate and inflation rate would be positively correlated.  The characterization above can result from a 
relatively higher estimated marginal cost of revenue from direct taxation in emerging economies than 
in developed economies, given inflation.  In any event, in the tests below we control for inflation in 
estimating the effects of the tax rate so that such an indirect effect, however unlikely, would not affect 
the interpretation of tax rate effects.   
22 The number of observations for each pair of variables shown in the correlation matrix differs and 
has been taken into account in assessing the t-statistic.    
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is opposite in sign and almost equal in magnitude.  In developed countries, higher 
taxes, like inflation, reduce the demand for money.  The tax rate has no significant 
correlation with the money multiplier in either emerging markets or developed 
countries.  In both emerging markets and developed countries inflation and money 
demand (velocity) are significantly negatively (positively) correlated.  Inflation also 
is negatively correlated with the money multiplier in developed countries, but not 
significantly so in emerging economies.   
 
 
Real per capita income is significantly and positively correlated with both money 
demand and with the money multiplier in both emerging and developed economies.  
In general, these results are strongly supportive of the hypotheses above with two 
exceptions.23  These exceptions are that the money multiplier is not significantly 
related to taxes in either set of countries, and it is not related to inflation in emerging 
economies.  These results also summarize well the more substantive results in the 
regression analysis below where, except for support for the quadratic tax effects 
found there and the absence of an income effect on velocity in emerging markets, the 
findings are identical.   
4.1. Regression Results  
 
The regression estimates for velocity are shown in Table 3 for both developed and 
emerging economies.  These estimates are reported with and without the inclusion of 
dummy variables that account for country specific differences--i.e. differences that 
are not accounted for by the included independent regressors--in velocity and (in the 
                                                 
23 Note that the average tax rate and real GDP per capita are significantly positively correlated, 
especially in emerging economies, as described above.  
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next table) money multiplier.  First, velocity regression estimates are presented that 
include all variables (except country dummies) followed by a preferred model that 
excludes insignificant variables.  Then estimates including country effect dummies 
are given.  
While the country effect dummies allow for country-specific differences in velocity 
or the multiplier that arise for reasons other than the other included measures, the 
included regression variables themselves are also country specific.  That is, some 
countries have relatively high or low inflation, tax rates or per capita income.  Thus 
the inclusion of country effects can bias the estimates and tests of the latter effects.  
Nevertheless, the country-effect equations do provide evidence on the robustness of 
these effects.   
 
In the absence of country effects, real GDP per capita in both emerging economies 
and in developed economies is not statistically significant and so the preferred 
equation shown in the second column on the right omits the GDP variable.  The 
absence of an effect of real GDP per capita on velocity indicates that money is 
normal, or its income elasticity of demand is unity so that increases in income have 
equal proportionate effects on money demand.24  The significant negative trend term 
for both sets of countries supports the view that there is a common rate of change in 
financial technology that lowers costs of holding and using financial services and 
boosts money demand.   
                                                 
24 Bordo and Jonung (1981) find this to be the case for the US over the period 1880-1972, and also for 
Norway and the UK when their institutional variables are included.  Only Canada and Sweden show 
significant and positive effects of real per capita income on velocity in the latter case, indicating 
income elasticities of money demand that are less than one.    
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In emerging economies, a rise in the tax rate reduces velocity (raises money 
demand), as the money demand hypothesis predicts.  However the negative 
coefficient on the square of the tax rate indicates that at a sufficiently high level of 
the tax rate, this effect reverses sign.  This tax rate, called the switching tax rate, is 
shown in the table to be 36.4%.25  At lower tax rates, a rise in the tax rate raises 
money demand; at higher tax rates, a rise in the tax rate lowers money demand.  
Inflation also has a significant negative effect on money demand in emerging 
markets, though this effect is smaller than in the developed economies. 
 
For developed countries, the tax variables have the opposite signs to those for 
emerging markets.  Thus there is again a switching-tax rate, but for developed 
countries a rise in taxes initially lowers money demand until a sufficiently high tax 
rate is reached.  Beyond this level, a higher tax rate boosts money demand, just as 
occurs at relatively low tax rates in emerging economies.  This tax rate at which 
switching occurs is estimated to be 42.3%.  Apparently at a high enough tax rate, the 
demand for money rises with the tax rate, as safe, less-risky assets become more 
attractive than risky assets.  High tax rates discriminate against risky assets and lead 
to repression of capital markets.   While the adjusted-R2 indicate that the variables 
included do not explain much of the variation observed in velocity across countries, 
the explanatory power is not unusually low for cross-section data.   
                                                 
25 The switching tax rate is found by setting the derivative of velocity with respect to the tax rate equal 
to zero and solving for the tax rate.  In terms of equation 1, the switching tax rate is (-a2/ 2a3). 
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The inclusion of country-effect dummy variables does not affect the sign or 
significance of the tax rate variable in either set of countries.26  Thus, the role of 
taxes in boosting money demand in emerging economies and lowering it in 
developed countries is robust to controlling for country effects.  However, with 
country effects included, the switching of the tax rate effect at higher rates in 
emerging economies is not statistically significant.  Capital market repression in 
developed countries remains statistically significant when country effects are 
included.  With country effects, inflation is not significant in either data set.  It is 
likely that the effect of inflation on velocity is being captured by the country dummy 
in the high-inflation countries.  The effect of real GDP per capita emerges as 
significant and negative when country effects are included, suggesting that money is 
a luxury, with demand increasing more than proportionately with income increases, 
and hence lowering velocity.  This differs from the insignificant effects of real per 
capita income when country effects are omitted (implying a unitary real per capita 
income elasticity of money demand).  While the fit of the estimates improves sharply 
when country effects are included, their inclusion biases the hypothesis tests so that 
we consider the results without country effects to be more appropriate for testing the 
hypotheses and for characterizing the effects.   
 
These regression estimates for velocity comport closely with the simple correlation 
evidence.  The principal differences are that the regression results allow for 
significant switching and re-switching in the effects of tax rates on money demand or 
financial deepening and also include time trends.  At low levels of taxation, tax hikes 
                                                 
26 The country effect dummy variables for the reported velocity estimates and for the money 
multiplier estimates are presented in Appendix B. 
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boost financial development as taxes play their role of providing an institutional 
foundation to the demand for money, as explained by Lerner.  Once taxes rise above 
about 37%, however, tax avoidance takes a toll on financial deepening.  At relatively 
high tax levels in developed countries (above about 42%), higher tax rates actually 
lead to a re-switching, boosting the financial sector, but apparently at the expense of 
entrepreneurial activity.  This effect is not large, however, according the simulated 
effects shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
A second, and more minor difference is that real income per capita is not related to 
velocity in the regression results (excluding country effects), unlike the significant 
negative correlations.  Presumably, the significant negative trend terms, which are 
correlated with real GDP per capita, account for the negative correlation coefficients 
in Table 2.   
 
It is difficult to judge the economic significance of the tax rate effects on velocity 
from the equation estimates alone.  Figure 1 shows the effects of the tax rate on 
velocity in both emerging and developed economies.27  The effects are based on the 
estimates excluding country effects in Table 3.  In each case the variation of velocity 
around its sample mean due to changes in the tax rate are plotted.   
 
The tax rate varies up to about 58 percent, about the maximum level in emerging or 
developed economies.  The asymmetric behavior of velocity in emerging and 
developing economies is evident.  Money demand increases as the tax rate rises in 
                                                 
27 Particularly striking is the U-shaped relation of velocity to the tax rate in emerging economies, 
reflecting the linear and quadratic tax effect; this relation was predicted by Bordo and Jonung (see 
note 16 above) as a result of financial development which, at least in part, the tax effort represents. 
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emerging economies, while it falls in developed countries.  At tax rates exceeding 
the switching-tax-rate, the patterns reverse, and money demand falls in emerging 
economies and rises in developed economies. 
 
Velocity is quite sensitive to movements in the tax rate in both sets of countries, 
especially at relatively low tax rates.  For comparison purposes the effects of 
variations in velocity due to changes in the inflation rate in developed countries is 
shown.  Note that the slopes of the curves (for tax effects and inflation effects) in 
developed countries are similar for tax and inflation rates in the range from 20 to 30 
percent, and actually higher at lower tax rates.  While velocity in developed countries 
falls (money demand rises) after the switching- tax rate of about 42.3%, the decline 
is not large compared with the absolute value of either the slope at lower tax rates or 
to the sensitivity (slope) with respect to inflation.  This negative slope steepens as the 
tax rate rises above the maximum tax rate used in the figure, but such tax rates are 
also beyond the sample range.   
 
The regression estimates for the money multiplier estimates are shown in Table 4.  
Excluding country effect dummies, the developed economies' regression estimate has 
many more coefficients that are not statistically significant than is the corresponding 
case for velocity in Table 3--only the time trend coefficient is significant at standard 
levels.28  In contrast, the regression estimate for emerging economies has 
                                                 
28 Multipliers have some noticeable outliers among developed countries.  The UK and Spain have 
multipliers that range from 15 to 40 since 1986, substantially higher than elsewhere.  These 
differences reflect much lower reserve requirements instead of differences in tax rates or inflation.  
Among emerging markets, two countries have multipliers above 10: South Africa and Portugal, after 
1994. 
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coefficients that, except for inflation, are all highly significant with the anticipated 
signs.  In the emerging market economies, a higher tax rate raises the M2 multiplier 
when tax rates are relatively low, but this sign reverses as the tax rate increases due 
to the effect of the quadratic tax-rate term.  This is consistent with the results for 
money demand as well, though the switching- tax rate at which the sign reverses is 
lower, 23.7%, closer to the sample mean for emerging market economies (explaining 
the lack of correlation between tax rate and multiplier shown in Table 2A). Also, the 
desired mix of currency, non-transactions deposits and transaction deposits is not 
affected by inflation in low-income countries since inflation has no significant effect 
on the M2 multiplier. but a higher real income per capita raises the multiplier, 
reflecting higher income elasticity of demand for non-transaction deposits relative to 
transaction deposits.  Finally, there is a significant positive trend in the multiplier for 
both emerging and developed economies.  These results are consistent with the 
velocity results and the hypothesis that technical change lowers the costs of financial 
services and holding money, boosting the size of the financial sector relative to the 
monetary base and boosting overall money demand.  
 
For developed countries, only the trend term is statistically significant in the absence 
of country effects.  In particular, there is no statistically significant effect of the tax 
rate on the M2 multiplier.  Note that this does not mean that the tax rate does not 
affect financial sector development.  It only means that there is no differential effect 
boosting M2 relative to the monetary base as there is in low-income countries.  The 
pair of tax rate variable coefficients is significantly different from zero only at a low 
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confidence level (about 85%) and the signs, magnitude and switching- tax rate are 
quite similar to those in emerging economies.  At conventional significance levels 
we cannot attach much importance to these similarities, but they are striking.29  
 
When country effects are included, the results for emerging economies are 
qualitatively the same, except the switching- tax rate rises by about one-fourth.  In 
particular, the tax rate has a significant positive effect on the money multiplier for 
tax rates up to about 30 percent, then the effect turns negative, with higher taxes 
reducing the money multiplier.  For developed countries, the inclusion of country 
effects has a major impact on the significance of the other estimated coefficients.  
The tax variables become statistically significant and have the same sign, magnitude 
and switching- tax rate as in the emerging economies' estimate.  In addition the effect 
of inflation on the money multiplier is negative and statistically significant in the 
developed country case, mirroring the velocity result and indicating that inflation 
reduces the demand for M2 relative to the monetary base in these countries.  
 
The principal difference between conclusions from the correlation coefficients and 
the regressions concerns the relationship between the multiplier and the tax rate.  The 
correlation coefficient between the tax rate and the money multiplier is insignificant, 
but in the regression estimates, there is a significant positive effect of the tax rate on 
the multiplier that switches to a negative effect at high tax rates, according to the 
regression estimates, especially for emerging economies.   
                                                 
29 In another, unreported, estimate we found only one other variable (or set of variables) to be 
significant: This equation included the constant, trend and the tax rate; in this estimate, the tax rate 
term had a coefficient of –6.6599 (t = - 3.26).   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To our knowledge, Lerner's insight of the beneficial tax effects enhancing money 
demand and financial sector development has not been previously examined or 
tested.  The orthodox view that individuals would react to taxes negatively in 
forming decisions about the use of domestic financial sector transaction deposits and 
holding non-transaction assets just as they rationally react to the other major cost of 
M2—inflation—seems so reasonable as not to have been questioned.  Indeed, in 
developed economies and at high tax rates in emerging economies this expectation is 
supported by the data.  However, the research here is motivated by an interest in 
financial development in transition and emerging economies, and for these purposes 
Abba Lerner’s original insight on the role of taxation in creating a demand for fiat 
money, the ultimate legal tender rationale, serves as our focus.30  We find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis in the experience of emerging economies.  
 
Nonetheless, there is also a critical caveat offered up by the evidence here.  As tax 
rates rise these beneficial effects for financial development disappear and reverse.  
Tax avoidance effects dominate at high tax rates as taxes reduce incentives to hold 
and use bank deposits relative to currency, foreign money or barter.  In fact, we find 
some evidence of re-switching invery high-tax-developed countries, where financial 
deepening increases with the tax rate because of the relatively low return from risky 
                                                 
30 As noted above, this idea was developed earlier by Knapp (1924).  We conjecture that Knapp’s 
notion—and probably Lerner’s, too—is that rarest of birds, a true innovation. We have searched the 
legal tender literature, surveys of the taxation literature, and reviewed what has been published in the 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences on money and on taxation.  Nothing there suggests that this idea 
has been proposed by anyone.  Their idea simply is not raised.    More recently, Martin Shubik (1987) 
article on fiat money in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics does not mention this possibility 
while reviewing all of the standard elements on the history of fiat and token money.  
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entrepreneurial activities.  Such financial deepening due to artificially raising the 
attractiveness of safe bank deposits represents a form of capital market repression, 
not unlike the growth- depressing effects of financial repression in many poor 
countries.  
 
Governments can promote financial development through efforts to achieve price 
stability and through a moderate degree of taxation.  Both policies promote an 
increased demand for domestic money, raising the size of the financial sector as a 
share of GDP.  Efforts to support tax effort through efficient enforcement and 
collection efforts that maximize taxpayer compliance are perhaps more important 
than the size of the tax rate itself, though the evidence here is only suggestive of this 
conclusion.  There is certainly a trade-off suggested that could keep the tax rate 
below the switching- level by more broad-based compliance with the tax law. 
  
We have not addressed the issue of optimal taxation here.  If tax rates affect financial 
deepening, the size of the banking sector and the growth rate, then these effects must 
be taken into account in assessing the optimal level and structure of taxation.  In 
particular, if tax rate increases boost growth indirectly through an effect on financial 
deepening then this indirect effect must be compared to the direct effects of taxes on 
growth that arise though incentives for capital formation.
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Appendix A 
Annual data for the tests 1970-2000 were obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics, using the year 2000 CD-ROM, the annual 
statistics volume for 2000, and recent monthly issues.     
 
Variable and Composition      IFS line # 
  
 
M2 = M1 + MQ                 34, 35 
 
V = M2/GDP,        99B (GDP) 
 
K = M2/Monetary Base      14 (Base) 
 
T = Tax Effort = Tax Receipts/GDP     80, 82 (Tax 
receipts) 
 
PDOT = CPI/CPI(-1)       64 
 
 
The real GDP per capita measures are based on World Bank data for real GDP in 
1996 international prices in US dollars and population.  These data are available 
through 1999 in most countries so regressions or statistics containing these measures 
implicitly end in 1999. 
 
Table A1 indicates the data availability for each measure.  There are large numbers 
of missing data.  For example, among emerging economies there is a maximum of 
961 possible observations 31 countries over 31 years), but the sample of common 
variables used for the velocity estimates is only 605 observations and for the money 
multiplier there are 633 observations.  Despite having slightly more than one-half as 
many developed countries, there are proportionately more observations for velocity 
(458) and money multiplier (462) estimates.  
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Table A1
Missing Data in 1970-2000 Sample
Money Tax Inflation Velocity Real GDP
Multiplier Rate per capita*
Developed (17)
AUSTRALIA 2000 98-00
AUSTRIA 98-00 99-00 98-00
BELGIUM 98-00 99-00 98-00
CANADA 98-00
DENMARK 2000 2000 2000
FRANCE 98-00 98-00 98-00
GERMANY 99-00 99-00 99-00 93-00
ITALY 99-00 99-00 70-73;99-00
JAPAN 94-00
NETHERLANDS 98-00 70-85; 99-00 98-00
NORWAY 98-00
SINGAPORE
SPAIN 99-00 99-00 99-00
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM 2000
UNITED STATES 91-93
Emerging Markets (31)
ARGENTINA 70-83 70-83;2000 70-82 70-82
BRAZIL 70-87;95-96;98-00 70-80 70-80 70-88
BULGARIA 70-90 70-87;2000 70-85 70-90;2000 70-79;98-00
CHILE 2000
COLOMBIA 86;89 70-93 86;89 70
CZECH REPUBLIC 70-93 70-93 70-94 70-93 98-00
ECUADOR
EGYPT (70-74;80,99,00) 2000
GREECE 99-00 97-00 99-00
HUNGARY 70-81 70-80 70-73 70-81 98-00
INDIA 2000 2000
INDONESIA 2000
JORDAN 2000
LATVIA 70-92 70-94 70-91 70-92 98-00
MALAYSIA 2000
MEXICO 70-79
MOROCCO 2000 2000
NIGERIA 96-00 95-00
PAKISTAN
PERU 70-83 70-83;00 70-83
PHILIPPINES
POLAND 70-79 70-83;89-93;00 70 70-79
PORTUGAL 99-00 99-00 ALL
ROMANIA 70-72 70-79 70-90 70-79
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 70-92 70-95;00 70-93 70-92 70-83;98-00
SOUTH AFRICA 91 91
SOUTH KOREA 2000
THAILAND 98-00
TUNISIA 70,71,00 70-71;00 70-83
TURKEY 70-86;00 70-86 98-00
VENEZUELA 99-00
* 2000 missing for all countries
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Appendix B 
Country Effects 
 
This appendix presents data on the country effects (dummy variables for each 
country) for velocity and the money multiplier in both developed and emerging 
economies.  Chart B1 shows the velocity and multiplier dummy variables for 
emerging countries.  The labels for the points are abbreviations for country names 
and are provided in Table B1 (as are the point values).  Generally the velocity 
deviations are negative (positive for money demand) and positive for the money 
multiplier.  Note that mostly Latin American countries make up the exceptions with 
relatively large velocity and low money demand.  The multiplier for South Africa 
stands out as unusually large, probably indicating a relatively low reserve ratio for 
the banking system.  The dummy for Venezuela is not included in the estimates to 
avoid an identity. 
Chart B1 
Emerging country effects for money demand and the multiplier are usually 
positive 
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For developed countries, the pattern of country dummies is more balanced.  Belgium 
and Italy have unusually large velocity (low money demand), presumably due to 
relatively high inflation over the period.  The correlation between the country effect 
for velocity and inflation is 0.29.  At the other extreme, Singapore stands out as a 
country with unusually low velocity (high money demand).  The UK and Spain have 
unusually high money multipliers, presumably due to relatively low ratios of bank 
reserves relative to bank deposits.  The dummy variable for the US is omitted to 
avoid an identity. 
 
Chart B2 
Velocity and Multiplier effects in developed countries 
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Table B1 below provides the abbreviations used in the preceding charts, the data 
points and whether the effects are statistically significant (bold).  
 
ableB1  
 
Developed Dummy for Emerging Dummy for Emerging Dummy for 
Country velocity Multiplie
T
r Country velocity Multiplier Country velocity Multiplier
Australia AU 0.099 0.431 Argentina AR 1.397 0.085 Nigeria N -0.834 2.983
Austria A -0.717 -3.604 Brazil BR -1.034 2.172 Pakistan PA -3.295 2.748
Belgium B 1.6 -0.828 Bugaria BU -1.417 0.471 Peru PE -0.056 0.802
Canada C 0.353 -0.377 Chile CHILE -0.355 -1.014 Philippines PH -1.84 2.791
Denmark D -0.394 -2.92 Colombia CO 0.422 1.137 Poland POL -0.58 0.415
France F 0.13 -5.85 Czech Rep CZ -2.195 1.028 Romania RO -1.506 1.369
Germany G -0.223 -5.528 Ecuador EC -0.008 1.516 Slovak Rep. SL.REP -1.358 1.586
Italy I 1.086 -5.544 Egypt EG -3.142 1.662 S. Africa SA -2.52 9.633
Japan J -0.148 1.893 Greece GR -1.784 0.326 S. Korea SK -1.392 2.958
Netherlands NE -0.523 -3.689 Hungary HU -0.657 0.225 Thailand TH -2.704 4.756
Norway NO -0.42 -1.459 India IN -3.206 3.609 Tunisia TUN -1.992 2.605
Singapore SI -1.138 -6.66 Indonesia INDO -0.757 3.893 Turkey TUR -0.644 1.815
Spain SP 0.269 5.73 Jordan J -3.27 0.557 Venezuela V 0 0
Sweden SW -0.392 -3.232 Latvia LA 0.005 0.154
Switzerland CH 0.361 0.365 Malaysia MA -2.224 1.731
UK UK -0.51 4.455 Mexico ME 0.505 1.168
US 0 0 Morocco MO -2.674 2.106
Bold figures are statistically different from zero (95%)
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Figure 1 
Effects of tax rates and inflation on velocity and the multiplier 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.0
1
0.0
3
0.0
5
0.0
7
0.0
9
0.1
1
0.1
3
0.1
5
0.1
7
0.1
9
0.2
1
0.2
24
2
0.2
4
0.2
6
0.2
8 0.3 0.3
2
0.3
4
0.3
6
0.3
8 0.4 0.4
2
0.4
4
0.4
6
0.4
8 0.5 0.5
2
0.5
4
0.5
6
0.5
8
T a x  R a te  o r in fla tio n  ra te
Ve
lo
ci
ty
 
M e a n  E M  ve lo c ity ad jus ted  fo r tax  e ffec t
M e a n  d eve lo pe d  cou n try ve loc ity ad jus ted
fo r ta x  e ffe c t
M e a n  d eve lo pe d  cou n try ve loc ity A d jus ted
fo r in f la tion
 32
Table 1 
Data Characteristics: Developed countries have higher money multipliers, lower 
velocity, higher taxes and lower inflation  
(sample period:1970-2000) 
 
 
Money 
Multiplier 
Velocity Tax Rate Inflation  Per Capita 
Real GDP* 
Developed 
Countries 
     
Mean 8.8625 1.9917 0.2761 5.6033 9.39($11979) 
Standard 
deviation 
4.9971 0.8416 0.1027 4.4326 0.2656 
Observations 507 504 475 527 503 
Emerging 
Economies 
     
Mean 3.6385 2.9770 0.2242 62.5506 8.05 ($2996) 
Standard 
deviation 
2.7531 1.5608 0.0972 356.5286 0.5779 
Observations 794 731 686 825 892 
Ratio of 
Developed 
to Emerging 
2.43 0.67 1.23 0.090 1.386** 
*Log level using 1996 international prices; ** difference 
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Table 2A 
Emerging Markets Correlation Coefficients, 1970-2000** 
 
 
 
Money 
Multiplier 
Velocity Tax Rate Inflation  Per Capita 
Real GDP* 
Money 
Multiplier 
---- -0.305 
(8.64) 
-0.021 
(0.55) 
-0.055 
(1.52)  
0.234 
(6.59) 
Velocity 
 
 --- -0.425 
(11.97) 
0.124 
(3.31) 
-0.196 
(5.25) 
Tax Rate 
 
  --- -0.057 
(1.47) 
0.297 
(8.00) 
Inflation 
 
   --- 0.041 
(1.14) 
Per Capita 
Real GDP 
    --- 
*log level 
** Bold: statistically significant; t-statistics in parentheses 
 34
Table 2B 
Developed Countries Correlation Coefficients,1970-2000** 
 
 
 
Money 
Multiplier 
Velocity Tax Rate Inflation  Per Capita 
Real GDP* 
Money 
Multiplier 
---- -0.218 
(5.00)  
-0.018 
(0.39) 
-0.218 
(5.02) 
0.274 
(2.72) 
Velocity 
 
 --- 0.382 
(8.92) 
0.245 
(5.66) 
-0.212 
(4.79) 
Tax Rate 
 
  --- -0.103 
(2.25) 
0.121 
(2.62) 
Inflation 
 
   --- -0.411 
(10.05) 
Per Capita 
Real GDP 
    --- 
*log level  
**Bold: statistically significant; t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 3  
Velocity Regression Estimates, 1970-2000** 
 Developed 
Countries With 
Country 
effects  
Emerging 
Economies 
  
With 
Country 
effects 
Constant 
 
2.6591 
(1.64) 
0.3799 
(1.56) 
5.1357 
(2.53) 
6.8102 
(9.07) 
6.3992 
(21.86) 
14.9019 
(8.50) 
Inflation  
 
0.0306 
(3.37) 
0.0317 
(3.53) 
--- 0.0003 
(2.41) 
0.0003 
(2.37) 
--- 
Tax Rate  
 
9.5818 
(5.14) 
10.0575 
(5.54) 
20.4112 
(7.86) 
-24.3059 
(-10.13) 
-22.3130 
(-9.39) 
-3.1070 
(-3.00) 
(Tax Rate)2  
 
-11.0184 
(-3.19) 
-11.8814 
(-3.52) 
-30.5079 
(-7.46) 
33.1296 
(7.66) 
30.8613 
(7.16) 
--- 
Per Capita 
Real GDP* 
-0.2426 
(-1.42) 
--- -0.6219 
(-2.83) 
-0.0077 
(-0.07) 
--- -1.1668 
(-5.65) 
Trend -0.0171 
(-2.83) 
-0.0212 
(-4.28) 
-0.0171 
(-3.08) 
-0.0273 
(-3.93) 
-0.0203 
(-3.15) 
-0.0322 
(-5.12) 
Adjusted-R2 0.273 0.273 0.752 0.284 0.227 0.670 
Standard 
error 
0.7343 0.7294 0.4292 1.3371 1.3697 0.8934 
Switching- 
Tax Rate 
43.5% 42.3% 33.5% 36.7% 36.4% NA 
* log level 
**t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Money Multiplier Regression Estimates, 1970-2000** 
 Developed 
Countries 
With country 
effects 
Emerging 
Economies 
With country 
effects 
Constant 
 
9.6431 
(1.00) 
-0.8838 
(-0.36) 
-5.9315 
(-4.80) 
-15.1959 
(-7.30) 
Inflation  
 
0.0654 
(1.20) 
-0.1377 
(-3.02) 
-0.0004 
(-1.58) 
--- 
Tax Rate  
 
11.8449 
(1.49) 
67.2623 
(3.7827) 
17.7033 
(4.40) 
9.7001 
(2.74) 
(Tax Rate)2  
 
-35.5954 
(-1.72) 
-115.5940 
(-4.03) 
-37.3591 
(-5.14) 
-16.1596 
(-2.56) 
Per Capita 
Real GDP* 
-0.6797 
(-0.66)  
--- 0.9163 
(5.63) 
1.8650 
(7.73) 
Trend 0.3510 
(9.70) 
0.2413 
(9.40) 
0.0430 
(3.76) 
0.0427 
(5.57) 
Adjusted-R2 0.247 0.598 0.138 0.809 
Standard 
error 
4.4050 3.1868 2.2623 1.0515 
Switching- Tax 
Rate 
23.1% 29.1% 23.7% 30.0% 
* log per capita income 
**t-statistics in parentheses 
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